

Los Alamos Strategic Studies Program

Negotiation Outcomes and Lessons Learned
Los Alamos National Laboratory, Los Alamos, New Mexico

NEGOTIATION OUTCOMES AND LESSONS LEARNED

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1. Background

The goal of the Los Alamos Strategic Studies Program (LASSP) at Los Alamos National Laboratory (LANL) is to develop a cadre of broad strategic thinkers who are familiar with and understand the security challenges facing the United States and the international community. The simulation or game scenario was included as a final activity in the Confronting Terrorism – CT2002 Workshop in which the participants, who were primarily scientists not versed in international relations, could apply what they had learned during the previous four days of the workshop. Workshop speakers were also invited to take part in the simulation, and nine speakers did so.

The goals of the game scenario negotiations were three-fold. First, the participants would learn first-hand about the challenges that negotiators face when attempting conflict resolution – imperfect information, unclear consequences of choices even when those choices are clearly defined, trade-offs that are difficult to measure, and multiple objectives and interests that are hard to specify. Second, the participants and facilitators would gain key insights from their negotiation experiences. In our case, such insights include the importance of:

- 1) Agreements made away from the negotiating table to the final negotiated resolutions,
- 2) All negotiators having an interest in a negotiated resolution and in facilitating constructive negotiations, and
- 3) The actions of individual negotiators to the negotiation outcomes.

Third, at the conclusion of the negotiations, the participants were asked to generate suggestions about how the US and other key players might respond to a similar incident if one were to occur. To highlight a few suggestions, the participants recommended that the UN take an active but neutral role as facilitator in the negotiations following such an act and that the negotiators work to minimize both the gains of the perpetrators of terrorist acts and the effects of such acts on the people they targeted.

Six teams of eight attendees were formed and conducted independent negotiations. Each team of negotiators included at least one workshop speaker. Two facilitators (individuals who had helped develop the game scenario) were present to record and moderate the negotiation process and note any insights and agreements that were reached. In forming the six teams, the workshop speakers were distributed across the teams so that no team had a preponderance of terrorism experts. To the extent that the game scenario participants' occupations were known, we assigned individuals to roles that were unrelated to their jobs. For example, we avoided assigning an epidemiologist the role of the WHO representative. However, we did endeavor to match personalities to roles. We also attempted to form teams so that it was unlikely that a single individual would dominate the negotiations on any of the teams. In other words, if a person with a "strong" personality was assigned to a given team, we tried to include another individual(s) with a "strong" personality to provide balance.

The evening before the day when the game was played, all of the participants attended a meeting at which basic instructions for the game scenario were discussed and sealed envelopes containing role assignments and information about the scenario and the participating negotiators were distributed. Participants were instructed to carefully read the enclosed documents before the game began and to not share or discuss them with anyone else.

The game as described in full in these proceedings consisted of negotiations among representatives from the UN, WHO, EU, US, REMA, Acta, Bindi, and the Chos following hostilities between Acta, Bindi, and Chos and the release of a (fictitious) biological agent. Representatives from each of the eight nations and organizations listed above received sealed instructions. The instructions were to “uncover the dimension of the problem; plan immediate cessation of hostilities and peacekeeping; address the demand for autonomy by the Chos people, the impact of the biological agent, and the need for humanitarian relief; and discuss the path forward” while attending to the interests of the nation/organization he or she represented. During the negotiations, the participants were allowed to bring new information into the game. For example, a negotiator could “receive” new instructions from his or her superiors or new information about the evolving situation in the region.

Below we present the results from each of the six teams of negotiators, important negotiation insights the participants and the simulation's creators derived from their experiences, and the participants' and facilitators' recommendations for future negotiations which might take place following a similar event.

2. The Game

The exercise began with peer group meetings in which the participants met with facilitators in groups according to their assigned roles (i.e., all of the UN representatives convened in one room, all of the REMA representatives in another, etc.) to answer any

final questions from the participants about the roles they were assuming. At these sessions (and as the negotiations progressed), it was clear that the participants had carefully read the documents the evening before and had come prepared to play their assigned roles convincingly. For example, one of the individuals acting as Chunya, the negotiator representing the Chos, came in military fatigues, while another individual playing the role of Chunya brought a vial of perfume that was to represent the remaining supply of the biological agent. Other participants brought photographs of their persona's families, and one individual who had been assigned the role of the WHO representative brought detailed graphs of the projected course of the Chospox epidemic.

After the peer group meetings, the six teams convened in separate rooms to begin the negotiations. The negotiations were scheduled to last from 9 AM to 3 PM, with a lunch break and morning and afternoon coffee breaks. While the participants were encouraged to continue negotiating with the other negotiators from their teams during these breaks, they were instructed to not interact with participants from other teams until after the negotiations had ended. The negotiations began with the representative from the UN asking each participant to introduce himself or herself and provide a brief summary of his or her interests. After these introductions the facilitators aided in the development of rules of conduct. Although the rules varied on the different teams, most reflected the need for the negotiators to respect each other and allow equal time to others to present their interests, ideas, and opinions. If it became necessary during the course of the negotiations, the facilitators were charged with reminding the negotiators of their rules of conduct. Following the development of the rules of conduct, the negotiations began. At the close of the negotiations, each team prepared a summary document to share with the rest of the group at a session immediately following the negotiations.

3. Negotiation Outcomes and Lessons Learned

During the negotiations, the facilitators took notes on the negotiation process and recorded agreements and other key points from the discussions. Following the game scenario, the facilitators and participants submitted comments about the negotiations that included outlines of and information about the negotiation process. Table 1 presents information about the negotiations from these write-ups. Each row of Table 1 corresponds to a different team of negotiators labeled A through F in Column 1. Columns 3-7 contain negotiation outcomes: the final status of the remaining biological agent; the final status of the perpetrators of the release of the biological agent; the final status of the Chos people; any foreign aid that resulted from the negotiations; and the level of regional stability at the end of the negotiations. Columns 2, 8, and 9 contain information about the process of the negotiations: the focus of the negotiations; whether deals made away from the negotiating table (side deals) were crucial to the outcome of the negotiations; and whether one or more participants were crucial to the outcome of the negotiations. In the "focus of negotiations" column, the topics are listed in alphabetical order rather than according to their prevalence in the negotiations. As noted above, the information in Table 1 is based on write-ups from the facilitators and game scenario

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participants. Thus, if the participants and/or facilitators misremembered events or omitted events, those erroneous events or omissions may be reflected in Table 1.

3.1 Negotiation Outcomes and Processes

The information in Column 2 indicates that all of the negotiations focused on health concerns. Most of the teams also focused on establishing a ceasefire and on the situation of the Chos. Despite these similarities, as shown in column 7, four of the six teams (Teams A-D) negotiated a peaceful resolution to the situation, while the remaining two (Teams E and F) ended in a state of war.

As detailed in Column 5, Final Status of the Chos, in each of Teams A-D, the Chos emerged from the negotiations with more recognition as a people than they had previously. The results range from the Chos receiving a non-voting seat on REMA to the Chos forming a provisional government. Although it varied in form, the Team A-D negotiations all resulted in foreign aid for the region. These teams also were similar in terms of the final status of the remaining biological agent; in each case, the remaining biological agent was to be surrendered at some point in the future. However, the four teams differed substantially in terms of the Final Status of the Perpetrators. The outcomes included the perpetrators remaining at large; the perpetrators being granted asylum by the US; the world court investigating and prosecuting the perpetrators; and Chunya "handl[ing]" the perpetrators (this was understood to mean that "they would be killed secretly or publicly before a Chos military tribunal that had a pre-determined outcome").

As one might predict, the discussion that followed the game scenario included comments about the unlikely nature of some of these outcomes. In terms of the range of outcomes just listed, it is possible that the negotiators from the different teams would have dealt with the perpetrators more consistently if they had used the biological agent in a manner that was more offensive than defensive. In particular, a purely offensive use of the biological agent may have lead to harsher treatment of the perpetrators. On the other hand, a buy-out in a time-critical situation involving a weapon of mass destruction may be a viable means of preventing further harm and destruction. The fact is that each of these teams negotiated the surrender of the remaining biological agent while the outcomes for the perpetrators were varied. This suggests that the existence of the biological agent presented a more urgent threat to the negotiators on these four teams than did the perpetrators of its release or perhaps that the Chos felt more strongly about protecting the perpetrators than they did about retaining control of the biological agent.

The negotiations of the remaining two teams, Teams E and F, resulted in war. At the completion of the negotiations for each of these teams, both the remaining biological agent and the perpetrators of its release were still at large (see columns 3 and 4 of Table 1) and the final status of the Chos was uncertain (see column 5 of Table 1). Although there were several offers of foreign aid in the Team F negotiations, none were agreed to. In Team E, the EU and the US agreed to reimburse Acta and Bindi for any livestock that were killed as part of the Chospox containment efforts and to provide monetary aid to Acta and Bindi if they agreed to allow REMA peacekeepers within their borders.

Teams E and F each considered a ceasefire at some point in their negotiations; in particular, Team E had the mechanics of a ceasefire outlined early in the negotiations. However, neither team was able to implement a lasting ceasefire. There are two potential reasons for this. First, on both teams, the interests of the Chos were not addressed until rather late in the negotiating session, and, in both cases, it was shortly after the introduction of the Chos interests that “war”¹ was declared on the Chos. Second, on each team the person acting as Chunya was a workshop speaker who was well versed in both negotiation skills and techniques used by terrorists. Although these two Chunya’s used very different negotiating techniques, each appeared to control the negotiations and their outcomes. The Team E Chunya left the negotiations several times and took a very strong stance when presenting her interests at the negotiating table. On this team, Chunya’s behavior may have been motivated by the way the game scenario was written. Specifically, one Team E facilitator summarized Chunya’s post-negotiation statements on this topic as follows: “After reading the game scenario documents, Chunya believed that the game scenario was strongly biased toward a peaceful outcome. Therefore, she decided that an aggressive stance would maximize her return at the negotiating table.” This suggests that constructive negotiations require that none of the key parties interpret the aims of the negotiation as the Team E Chunya did. On Team F, Chunya also left the negotiations several times, but was otherwise, fairly quiet and revealed very little during the negotiations. One of the Team F facilitators surmised that the Chunya role-player acted this way in order to “discover the motives and positions of the other [negotiators]” and that “this strategy was [likely] based on his military training.” Thus, Teams E and F both featured a Chunya who was not a full participant in the negotiations. Although the negotiators on these teams attempted to include Chunya in the negotiations, when their efforts were unsuccessful, they continued their negotiations without the Chos leader. It is possible that, for these two teams, declarations of war against the Chos resulted in part because the other negotiators felt a need to punish Chunya for being “difficult.”

However, Team A also featured a workshop speaker acting as Chunya, but they were able to negotiate a peaceful resolution to the situation. On this team, Chunya engaged in the negotiations and the interests of the Chos were represented throughout the negotiations. In Team C, the WHO representative tried to counter the strong negotiating skills of the workshop speaker acting as Chunya: “It became clear to me, early on, that Commander Chunya...could overpower all of us with his superb negotiating tactics. Therefore, I tried to erode his position with new developments that marginalized the weaponized Chospox threat and allowed Acta and Bindi to cooperate, irrespective of Chos approval.” Two of the teams that had peaceful resolutions also featured personalities that were crucial in determining the negotiations’ outcomes. On Team C, the UN representative’s “forceful interventions during the negotiations process were instrumental in leading the negotiations and reaching an agreement.” On Team D, Chunya “was aggressive and bargained very hard. He was able to get what he wanted for the Chos people.” However, unlike the other two teams with a strong Chunya, this team’s Chunya was an active

¹ While war can only be declared on states, we use the term in this context because it succinctly describes the outcome of the negotiations.

participant, and the negotiations did not end in war. Attributing this peaceful resolution to one or more characteristics of the Team D negotiations is difficult; however, two aspects of the negotiations are likely to have contributed to it. First, as discussed further below, Team D developed a positive environment for negotiating, with several negotiators promoting this environment. Second, Team D's Chunya made a key concession by agreeing to deliver the remaining biological agent. The Team D facilitators reported that this agreement was crucial to Team D has negotiated resolution.

In five of the six teams, side deals (deals made away from the negotiating table) were key to the outcome of the negotiations. For the two teams that ended in war against the Chos, the decision to declare war on the Chos was made away from the negotiating table. For three of the four teams that resulted in a peaceful resolution, discussions undertaken away from the negotiating table permitted the final publicly made agreements. For example, the Team A negotiations resulted from three side deals. First, the US helped the Acta ambassador assume power in Acta and agreed to "support covert action to interrogate and punish the terrorists and get information about the biological agent." In exchange for this, the Acta ambassador would allow UN peacekeepers in Acta. Second, Acta and Bindi agreed to "total cooperation" and to let the US to take the lead on covert action. Third, Chunya agreed to "handle" the terrorists as explained above and to let the US interrogate the terrorists, analyze the biological agent, and review books with technical information. In return, the US agreed to support the UN peacekeeping force and to share the books mentioned above and the biological agent with the WHO. Although some of these side deals would likely not be made in a "real life" situation, with these pieces in place, the team of negotiators was able to agree to place UN peacekeepers in the area to "maintain peace [and] establish and support a health infrastructure."

3.2 Negotiating Lessons Learned

The negotiators and facilitators commented on:

- Negotiation and communication styles that facilitated the negotiation process,
- Individual actions that enabled constructive negotiations,
- The need for each negotiator to be interested in negotiating a resolution to the Situation,
- The potential impact of decisions made early in the negotiation process,
- The importance of concessions to reaching a negotiated resolution,
- The potential importance of the WHO representative, and
- The impact that the presence of a weapon of mass destruction had on the negotiations.

Several participants and facilitators commented on negotiation and communication styles that facilitated the negotiations. On Team B, the EU ambassador set the stage for successful negotiations by suggesting that the participants re-arrange the furniture in the negotiating room so that the negotiators could sit together around a small table and make

eye contact. A Team C facilitator reported that, "frequent pauses [in] the negotiations to redefine terms and language were important to create an atmosphere of understanding." Similarly, one participant observed, "information sharing was the key to a 'win/win' solution, and should be encouraged in real life negotiations." The Team D facilitators noted two key "themes" which aided in their negotiations. First, "the group managed to develop a good Win, Win, Win attitude." Second, "representatives worked to ensure that everyone understood the agreements and issues." In addition, the negotiators agreed that "all [issues] needed to remain on the table at least to some extent in order to come to any true agreement," and "the group generally did not get stuck on the issue of blame."

Individual negotiators also effectively encouraged a dynamic negotiating environment. As noted in the previous section, on Team C the "UN [representative's] unequivocal condemnation of [the] terrorist act set the tone at [the] start" and the UN ambassador's "underlying desire to reach an agreement was crucial in facilitating concessions by the players." Team D featured several negotiators who enabled the negotiation process. First, the REMA and EU representatives "worked to maintain civility and to point out commonalities of view, in particular early in [the] discussions." The REMA representative also "worked hard to build consensus, such as general condemnation of the use of weapons of mass destruction." On this team, the UN representative was important as she "quickly brought the Acta representative under control as he became out of line" and "became a unifying force in the discussions. She continually pointed out that there were compatibilities in the ideas expressed by various representatives. She also highlighted respect as being key to the discussions." Hence, the participants and facilitators realized that individual negotiators can actively support the negotiation process.

The negotiators also observed that effective negotiations require that all of the negotiators have an interest in the negotiation process. The peaceful resolution on Team B was enabled by Chunya's realization that his people were dying of Chospox and, thus, that he had an incentive to negotiate. This team's negotiations were further enhanced by the fact that the UN, EU, and US did not have any "major disagreements among themselves," thus allowing them to focus on the situation at hand. In contrast, one Team E facilitator commented that "Chunya acted as though she had no interests to protect." This facilitator concluded that "if one of the key negotiators [negotiates as though she has nothing to lose], there is no point to negotiating." On Team E, the negotiations may have been further undermined by the perception of some of the negotiators that the EU and US did not express a strong interest in the situation. Consequently, our game scenario simulations underscored that when all key parties are interested in negotiating and are not overwhelmed by the situation; it is more likely that the negotiations will result in a peaceful resolution. The results discussed in this paragraph and the previous one further suggest that negotiators can take on different roles in the negotiation process. In particular, some individuals are drivers of the negotiations in that they are very active negotiators, while others facilitate the negotiations by helping to create a constructive environment for the negotiations and to move the negotiation process forward.

On two teams, decisions made early in the negotiating process supported the negotiations' end results. Team B limited its negotiations to short-term issues pertaining to the health emergency in the region while shelving the difficult-to-solve issues. The limited scope of the negotiations allowed the negotiators to make progress with respect to the immediate threat since they did not get bogged down in the more difficult long-term issues. Similarly, on Team C, "from the beginning [the] negotiations were facilitated by [a] proposed 'buffer zone' in Bindi.... This zone guaranteed safety [and protection] and instituted [a] quarantine in the region."

For three teams, concessions made by individual negotiators were crucial to their reaching peaceful resolutions. For example, a Team B facilitator observed that the negotiators made several concessions toward the end of the negotiation period so that an agreement could be reached. Similarly, a Team C negotiator reported that "a seemingly impassable stalemate was created until the first concession, and then [the] negotiations became easier." Finally, on Team D Chunya agreed to deliver the remaining biological agent and cooperate; this "key concession...made...late in the discussion ...helped to finalize...the proposed agreement." Hence, the results of our game scenario suggest that individual concessions can be the turning point in negotiations. At the same time, given the instructions to the participants and the limited time allotted to the negotiations, it seems likely that the negotiators on some of the teams may have been more conciliatory than they would be in a similar "real life" situation. It is also possible that some negotiators agreed to conditions or actions that they were not planning to comply with. After the conclusion of the negotiations in future game scenarios, it would be interesting to poll the participants about their likely compliance with the details of the negotiated resolution.

Several of the individuals who acted as the WHO representative, believed that this role could be quite influential in the negotiations. In particular, as the Team B WHO representative stated, if the WHO representative "continually impressed" the "uncertainty [about the nature of the biological agent and the long-term impacts of its release] and [the] gravity of the situation...upon the group, this created a common problem upon which cooperative efforts could be focused. Scientific facts had great influential power due to an environment of uncertainty and a critical need for a great deal of information [such as how much and where the biological agent had been released], which was currently lacking. ... The relevance of scientific facts...could help to keep personal agendas at bay, or re-route them from being mutually destructive to [being] cooperatively constructive." The Team A WHO representative concurred that "limiting input to the medical ramifications, in simple, graphic and compelling terms, let the 'politicians' draw their own conclusions about the need for cooperation" and that "a consistent stream of 'new developments' kept the urgency level moving up, making it more difficult for entrenched positions to persist." The US representative from Team C noted that the WHO representative "kept stressing the importance of addressing the immediate containment of the agent...and the need to absolutely prevent any further release of this agent. This prejudiced my (the US) negotiating stance." The Team B facilitators observed that an initial briefing by the WHO representative "was so effective that the

group deferred all questions about the [biological] agent to the WHO representative for the rest of the game." The WHO representative from this team periodically received calls updating the situation; this served to focus the discussion on the health emergency. Thus, although the WHO representative did not represent one of the countries directly involved in the release of the biological agent, he was able to leverage his scientific knowledge in order to focus the negotiations on the health issues at stake in at least half of the team's negotiations.

A number of participants noted that the use and threat of use of a weapon of mass destruction added to the urgency of the negotiations. For example, the negotiators on Team E agreed that "dealing with a terrorist and a weapon of mass destruction drove the negotiations. In a different type of scenario, [our] negotiating styles would have been different; in particular, there would have been less time pressure to quickly resolve the situation." Moreover, on this team the presence of a weapon of mass destruction "drove Acta, Bindi, and REMA to pursue a swift response [a joint declaration of war on the Chos by Acta and Bindi with REMA support] to stabilize the region." The US representative from Team C reported that "intervention by the OTP [Outside Totalitarian Power], via REMA, with the information that more agent would be quickly released in the United States and other countries unless the situation with the Chos terrorists was immediately resolved greatly influenced the circumstances. The decision on the part of the US ambassador to give the small group of Chos terrorists 'immunity' in order to obtain the agent information and antidote ... was based upon this development." Moreover, one Team A negotiator thought that the threat of a biological weapon could have as much influence as the possession of an actual biological weapon. "As I reflect on the outcome, I am left with the conclusion that the threat of a biological weapon, in the hands of a skilled negotiator..., was just as effective as having an actual biological weapon in achieving [the negotiator's] political objectives." Similarly, after being accused of blackmail when she stated that "the rebel leaders might choose to use the remaining biological agent in an undetermined location," the Chos negotiator from Team C wondered "how realistic it would be in a real life situation to try to blackmail the US (or another country) by demonstrating a credible threat and threatening more destruction if the demands of the group are not met. If the US did not have sufficient intelligence to be able to pinpoint the location of the perpetrators (or the weapons they claimed to have), would it have any other choice than to allow itself to be blackmailed?"

3.3 Suggestions for Similar Situations

Facilitators and negotiators from several teams offered comments about how to approach future situations similar to that described in the game scenario. In addition, the REMA representatives from the six teams offered "recommendations for actions [following] future [similar] conflicts" to the UN, and the Bindi representatives completed a survey of questions relevant to responding to such situations in the future. In this paragraph, we address comments from the facilitator and negotiator write-ups, while the next two paragraphs detail the comments from the REMA representatives and the survey of Bindi representatives. One Team C participant "was very impressed by the extent to which the

US cooperated with the WHO” in terms of “information sharing.” She added that “the unqualified financial, logistical and military support that the US offered...made the scenario a win-win for our group. The US should be prepared (logistically) to offer this type of support in a real event.” On Team D, “not giving in to terrorism was key to many of the representatives at the table.” The Team D representatives also “agreed that nipping this sort of [terrorist] activity in the bud in the future is important.” The US ambassador from Team C concurred that “a zero tolerance attitude with respect to any terrorist act should be maintained, but situations could arise that necessitate actual negotiations ‘on behalf of terrorists’ in order to prevent damage on a much larger scale.” This negotiator also stated that “if the release of an engineered [biological agent] were to occur, the primary goal should be the isolation and complete identification of the agent(s) concurrent with treatment” and that “with any [weapon of mass destruction] deployment, total assessment of the threat and understanding [of] the complete political situation [will] be essential before countermeasures can be taken.” The Team B ambassador from Acta agreed that the US should “work diplomatically to minimize the gains of those who employed the weapon of mass destruction” and that it was important to “denounce the use of [a weapon of mass destruction] against a civilian population as an act of terrorism” and to “pledge medical and economic aid to the victims of the terrorist attack.” However, this individual did not recommend that the US formally adopt such a policy to cover all situations in which a weapon of mass destruction is used against civilians since it could cause the US to look “hypocritical” (for example with respect to its use of nuclear weapons to end World War II or for “consider[ing] the use of tactical nuclear weapons against, for instance, deeply buried military targets”) and could place the US in a difficult situation if one of its allies used a weapon of mass destruction. Thus, the game scenario participants realized that there is a tension between solving real world problems and the joint principles of taking a hard stance against terrorism so that terrorists are not rewarded and mitigating the effects of acts of terrorism on the individuals and countries they targeted. Moreover, a zero-tolerance policy with respect to terrorism may make negotiations such as those conducted in this game scenario problematic for it is difficult to envision how one can conduct negotiations pertaining to an act for which one has “zero-tolerance.”

The REMA representatives recommended that the UN representative’s role be that of a “neutralizing factor” that could “work with the regional coordinators.” They also suggested several ways that the UN might facilitate negotiations in a situation similar to that in the game scenario. First, the UN representative could help maintain a constructive environment for the negotiations by “encourag[ing] productive multi-lateral discussions” and “stimulat[ing] and coordinat[ing]...communications.” Second, the UN representative could further the negotiation process by “ensur[ing]” that “complexities [were] recognized” and grasped, that “possible future scenarios [under] different proposals” were teased out, and that “agreements between parties were understood.” Finally, the UN could assist in the actual negotiations by “consider[ing] partial agreements [when the] endgame was not understood” and “expanding the [range of] options [under consideration].” The individuals who had acted as UN ambassador concurred that the UN representative was “key to the negotiations” since he or she could “set the tone of the

negotiations by establishing a climate of mutual trust,” “identify common interests,” “keep the discussions going,” and “offer new options when necessary.”

The survey of the six Bindi representatives was broad in scope, covering topics such as the use of foreign aid, the perceptions of the superpowers, and the use of covert activities. In the survey, three Bindi representatives agreed that the US did not deal with the terrorists harshly enough in the final negotiated resolution, while all agreed that one should deal with terrorists either by “extreme force or [a] buy off.” Expanding on the last statement, all agreed that “giving support (money or access) [to a rogue element] likely [would] not be helpful [in the] long term. [However, in the] short term it [could help]...a situation ...[was] threaten[ing] global security.” All disagreed with the statement that “It is acceptable [for] US money [to] come with conditions/restrictions.” Instead, they thought that “money should be staged and have [a] specific target, but the locals should be free to spend [it] as needed. If they don’t spend it properly, then it’s appropriate not to send more.” Half agreed that “it is acceptable for the US to solve a local crisis with global implications by covert actions” and all agreed to the use of covert actions if it was an “international solution.” Finally, with respect to the role the US might play in a situation similar to that in the game scenario, all agreed that US military occupation was not acceptable, while half agreed that military oversight was acceptable (another two agreed that it was acceptable with a deadline), and five agreed that the involvement of the US in the medical issues was acceptable. Finally, all of the Bindi representatives concurred that “none of the international powers could differentiate [among] the players in the local situation.”

4. Suggestions for Future Game Scenarios

The comments of the participants and facilitators contained several suggestions for future game scenarios. These suggestions focused on the role of the facilitators, when the negotiators should be given the game scenario information, and how much background information the negotiators should receive about each other. Each of these issues is discussed below.

We begin with the role of the facilitators. As described earlier, the negotiators were allowed to introduce new information into the game in real time (e.g., the WHO representative could receive regular updates about the number of people with Chospox or a negotiator could obtain new negotiating instructions from his or her "home office"). Overall, the ability to introduce new developments into the game is positive for, in the words of a Team C facilitator, it "can add completely different dynamics to the negotiations [on different teams]." However, for Team E this flexibility became problematic as in the words of the facilitators "the participants realized that they could announce events that were unlikely to have happened in real time and that were possibly outside of the game's boundaries (e.g. Acta and Bindi have just destroyed all of the Chos people; therefore, the game is over)." One remedy would be to allow the facilitator to "referee" new information before it is brought into the game. Such a capability would

need to be used sparingly and carefully so that it did not overly influence the outcome of the game.

Second, the game developers struggled with how far in advance the negotiators should be given the game materials. There was a tension between allowing enough time for the participants to master the information and not tempting them to discuss the game scenario with anyone before the negotiations began. In order to minimize the opportunities for such discussions, the game scenario materials were distributed the evening before the negotiations with instructions not to discuss them. However, this may not have been ideal. As one Team C facilitator wrote, the "players would have benefited if they had their roles available to them earlier.... One night to read the whole game scenario and their roles was apparently not enough." One possible compromise would be to distribute the game scenario itself several days in advance of the negotiations and hand out the role assignments the evening before the negotiations.

Finally, although they received basic information about each of the negotiators and the organization he or she represented, the Team E participants would have benefited from more background information about each other. In particular, some of the Team E participants felt that they could not trust Chunya and that Chunya "appeared to not have the power to negotiate on behalf of the Chos." In actual negotiations, the negotiators frequently receive briefing books about each other and may know each other personally. Providing each participant with more detailed background information on all of the other negotiators could create a more realistic negotiation scenario and might have mitigated the mistrust of Chunya that occurred on Team E. However, it is doubtful that any amount of background information could alleviate all of the mistrust that would likely follow an event such as the one described in the game scenario.

5. Conclusion

The participants and facilitators learned several key lessons during the game scenario exercise. First, on five of the six teams, they realized the importance of side deals to the outcome of the negotiations. Second, they came to appreciate that individual negotiators can affect the negotiations end results. For example, four of the six teams featured negotiators who were deemed crucial to the outcome of the negotiations. Other individuals enabled the negotiations through their actions and words, such as working to build consensus, pointing out compatibilities, and agreeing to concessions that allowed the negotiations to move forward. Third, the participants on Teams B and E learned that successful negotiations require that all negotiators be interested in a negotiated resolution. And last, the participants and facilitators realized that the use and possibility of further use of a weapon of mass destruction can lead to a sense of urgency that can drive negotiations.

The developers of the game received feedback that may be reflected in future game scenarios. In particular, allowing the facilitators a limited capacity to referee new information as it comes into the game may be a useful way of preventing the game from

spinning out of control. We will also consider distributing the game materials further in advance of the game scenario and providing the participants with more information about all of their negotiating partners.

Finally, the results from the six teams suggest that a single game scenario can lead to a variety of outcomes.² This points to the need for multiple simulations in defense-related and other game scenarios that aim to provide decision-makers with information about responses to specific types of scenarios. In particular, games played by teams of individuals with different backgrounds could be useful. For example, a single scenario could be acted out by a team of high-level government officials, a team of full colonels and general officers, a team of senior-level DOD civilians, a team of high-ranking business people, a team of academics and individuals who work at think tanks, and a team of individuals drawn from the five previous groups. Since veterans of government, the military, the DOD, business, and academia typically have different educational backgrounds and approaches to problem solving, the results from the different teams would likely reflect these differences and might suggest novel negotiating strategies. Designed experiments could also focus on specific aspects of the negotiation process. For example, we might assess the extent to which certain facts of a given scenario (e.g. for the game scenario discussed in this paper, the Chos' use of a conventional versus a non-conventional weapon or the presence or absence of a supportive Outside Totalitarian Power) or the decision-making tools available to the negotiators affect the negotiation outcomes. Such activities are a subject of future research.

² We thank David Banks for helping to clarify some of the ideas in this paragraph and for suggesting the utility of designed experiments in this context.

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 ♦ Negotiations Outcomes and Lessons Learned ♦ ©

Team	Focus of the Negotiations	Final Status of the Remaining Biological Agent	Final Status of the Perpetrators	Final Status of the Chos	Foreign Aid	Regional Stability	Crucial Side Deals	Crucial Personalities
A	Ceasefire; health concerns.	It will be found and delivered to the WHO.	Chunya will give them to the US for interrogation and then “handle” them. (See text.)	The UN will facilitate negotiations designed to result in a semi-autonomous region for the Chos.	UN: \$200 M EU: \$200 M US: \$200 M, with possible \$800 M later	Ceasefire with a joint peacekeeping force in Acta and Bindi. Acta and Bindi to begin port access negotiations. US aid for stabilization and development.	Formed the building blocks for the final agreement. (See text.)	None.
B	Ceasefire; health concerns; situation of the Chos.	The Chos will surrender it.	At large.	Troops from Bindi will leave the Chos region. Infected troops from Acta will be isolated within the region. The Chos will form a provisional government.	US/EU/UN: Short term: Food, medicine, clothing. Long term: Schools; communication and transportation infrastructure; technical solution for the biological agent-caused disease.	Two-week ceasefire to address medical emergency with access for WHO workers accompanied by protective peacekeepers. REMA to provide regional military stability.	None.	None.
C	Ceasefire; health concerns; situation of the Chos.	The Chos will forfeit the remaining agent to REMA and the WHO.	Granted asylum by the US.	The Chos will receive a non-voting seat in REMA.	US: Money for the whole region. Bindi: Support for economic development in the Chos region.	Ceasefire with 30 day buffer zone (bz) inside of Acta. REMA forces escort WHO in bz; Acta forces escort WHO in the rest of Acta.	Helped lead to consensus among the negotiators.	The UN representative’s strong presence helped determine the outcome.
D	Autonomy; health concerns; justice.	The Chos will deliver the remaining biological agent.	The World Court will investigate and prosecute them; Chunya will cooperate in this effort.	The Chos will receive a seat in REMA; troops from Acta and Bindi will leave the region; in 6 months a meeting on Chos autonomy will convene.	UN/EU/US: Jointly pledge \$900 M to Acta and Bindi for economic development; the money will be overseen by REMA.	Ceasefire, with REMA/UN peacekeepers to protect healthcare workers with EU/US support.	Most of the negotiations that led to the agreement were undertaken away from the negotiating table.	Chunya was aggressive and drove a hard bargain.
E	Health concerns; situation of the Chos.	At large.	At large.	Uncertain because war declared on the Chos.	EU/US: 1) Reimburse Acta and Bindi for any livestock which must be killed. 2) Provide monetary aid to Acta and Bindi if they will permit REMA peacekeepers within their borders.	Early on: Ceasefire with UN peacekeepers in Bindi and REMA peacekeepers in Acta. Finally: Acta and Bindi declare war on the Chos with REMA support and tacit EU support.	US/EU agree to give money to Acta and Bindi in exchange for allowing REMA peacekeepers within their borders. Acta and Bindi agree to declare war on the Chos with REMA support and tacit EU support.	Chunya’s strong stance seemingly prevented a peaceful outcome.
F	Ceasefire; health concerns; situation of the Chos.	At large.	At large.	Uncertain because war declared on the Chos. Chunya arrested.	Offers, but none agreed to: EU: Medical support; long-term economic assistance. UN: Money. WHO: Long term medical care. US: Medical support; money for infrastructure, education, and peacekeeping.	Early on: Ceasefire with peacekeepers considered; REMA offers to facilitate discussions among Acta, Bindi, and the Chos. Finally: Acta and Bindi declare war on the Chos.	Acta and Bindi agree to jointly declare war on the Chos.	The negotiations were passively controlled by Chunya who revealed very little information and was largely silent throughout the negotiations.

Table 1: Results from the 6 teams of negotiators. The first column denotes the negotiation team. The second column lists in alphabetical order the topics on which each team’s negotiations focused. Columns 3-7 display information about the outcome of the negotiations: the final status of the remaining biological agent, the perpetrators, and the Chos people; the amount of any foreign aid pledged to the region; and the final level of regional stability. The remaining two columns contain information about the negotiation process: whether side deals (deals made away from the negotiating table) and particular negotiators were crucial to each team’s negotiation outcomes.

